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Criminal jurisdiction in Montana Indian country derives from
an allocation of authority among federal, state, and tribal courts.1
The allocation of authority in particular cases depends, in general,
upon three factors: the subject matter of the crime, the persons
involved in the crime, and the locus of the crime.2 The basic limits
of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country have been defined, but
subtle ambiguities remain. These ambiguities vary among the fed-
eral circuit courts. For example, the term "Indian" generally de-
fines a person who has some Indian blood, and is also regarded as
an Indian by his community.3 However, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals held that for federal jurisdictional purposes, not only must
the individual be regarded as an Indian by his community, but the
person must also be considered a member of a federally-recognized
tribe." In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
individual need not be formally enrolled in a recognized tribe to be
regarded as an Indian for federal jurisdictional purposes.'
The definition of "Indian country" also lacks precision. For
purposes of criminal jurisdiction,
[T]he term "Indian country," means (a) all land within the limits
1. This comment does not apply to Indian country over which the state has taken
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Pub. L. No. 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1968). In Montana,
Pub. L. No. 280 affects only the Flathead Indian Reservation, which is specifically covered
by MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301 (1985), "The State of Montana hereby obligates and binds
itself to assume. .. criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory of the Flathead
Indian reservation .... " The agreement reached by Montana and the Flathead Tribe pro-
vides for concurrent Montana and tribal jurisdiction in criminal matters, in the Law and
Order Code of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
ch. 1, § 2(3)(4). Note, however, that the United States has retained jurisdiction to punish a
member of the Flathead Reservation, who passed a forged check to a non-Indian while on
the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, in United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 842 (1971).
2. UNITED STATES ATroREYS' MANUAL, ch. 20, at 12 (1984). The author wishes to
thank both Pete Dunbar, U.S. Attorney for Montana, and Marge Brown, Acting Dean of the
University of Montana Law School, for their valuable assistance.
3. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2, 19 (1982). See also Clinton, Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIz. L.
REv. 503 (1976) for a comprehensive overview of this topic.
4. Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 (1st Cir. 1979).
5. United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
859 (1979).
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of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States government ... (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the origi-
nal or subsequently acquired territory thereof ... (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.6
Montana Indian country typically includes all land within reserva-
tion boundaries 7 and Indian allotments beyond reservation bound-
aries which are still in a trust status.'
Within Indian country, subject matter jurisdiction of federal,
state, and tribal courts hinges on a circuit's interpretation of the
nature of the crime9 and whether the persons involved are In-
dian. 10 Crimes with a locus in Montana Indian country, whether
major or non-major,1 can be separated into six classifications:
(a) Indian Offender, Indian Victim
(b) Indian Offender, Non-Indian Victim
(c) Indian Offender, Victimless Crime
(d) Non-Indian Offender, Indian Victim
(e) Non-Indian Offender, Non-Indian Victim
(f) Non-Indian Offender, Victimless Crime
This comment focuses strictly on criminal case law from Montana,
the Ninth Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. It serves
as a quick reference tool for determining criminal jurisdiction in
Montana Indian country.
II. INDIAN OFFENDER, INDIAN VICTIM
Shortly after the American Revolution, Congress extended
federal jurisdiction to non-Indians committing crimes against Indi-
ans in Indian territory, as part of the overall federal policy of pro-
viding a buffer between non-Indian and Indian populations. 12 In
1817, Congress passed the first version of the Federal Enclaves Act,
which extended federal jurisdiction to cover crimes by both Indi-
ans and non-Indians in Indian country, with the key exception of
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949).
7. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978). See also State ex rel. Irvine v. District
Court, 125 Mont. 398, 413, 239 P.2d 272, 280 (1951) (all land within limits of any organized
and supervised Indian reservation is "Indian Country," including patented land and rights-
of-way running through reservation).
8. United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 (1926).
9. W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 89 (1981).
10. UNITED STATEs ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, ch. 20, at 14.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1984).
12. 1 Stat. 138 (1790), 1 Stat. 743 (1799), 2 Stat. 139 (1802).
514 [Vol. 47
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crimes by Indians against Indians."3 Under the Enclaves Act, "the
general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses
committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States shall extend to the Indian country.""
A broad exception to exclusive federal jurisdiction exists in
section two of the Enclaves Act:
[The Act] shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any In-
dian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been
punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is
or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.15
Until Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act in 1885, the ex-
ception in the Enclaves Act covered all offenses by Indians against
Indians in Indian country, as made clear in a renowned case in
1883. Citing the Enclaves Act, the Supreme Court reversed a fed-
eral court conviction of an Indian for the murder of another In-
dian.16 The Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog1 7 held that federal courts
had no jurisdiction over the crimes by an Indian offender against
an Indian victim in Indian country. Congress quickly reacted to
Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes Act, which created federal
jurisdiction over seven crimes (including murder) committed by
Indians in Indian country, whether the victims were Indian or non-
Indian.'8 Subsequent amendments have expanded the number of
major crimes to sixteen:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of an-
other Indian or other person any of the following offenses,
namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, rape, carnal
knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained the
age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest,
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary,
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the
Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as
all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 9
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1948).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
17. Id. at 572.
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Incest, burglary, and involuntary sodomy remain the only enumer-
ated crimes undefined by federal law, so applicable state law de-
fines these three crimes.20
Under the Major Crimes Act, federal courts have jurisdiction
of offenses named in the Act when committed by an Indian against
the person or property of another Indian or other person in Indian
country.2 1 Legislative history indicates that Congress incorporated
the words "or other persons" in the 1885 Major Crimes Act to
make certain that Indians could be prosecuted in federal court.2 2
The following year, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved of this federal extension into tribal affairs in United States
v. Kagama.2 3 Nearly a century later, in United States v. Antelope,
the Court precisely reaffirmed the Kagama rule, and held that the
Major Crimes Act grants jurisdiction to federal courts over Indians
who commit any of the listed major offenses, regardless of whether
the victim is also an Indian.2 4 Similarly, in State ex rel. Bokas v.
District Court,2 5 the Montana Supreme Court discussed the Major
Crimes Act. The Bokas court held that an Indian ward, while re-
siding on and within the exterior boundaries of his Indian reserva-
tion, is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government
in regard to all crimes recognized and made applicable to Indian
country by Congress. 26 Procedurally, Indian offenders prosecuted
under the Major Crimes Act "shall be tried in the same courts, and
in the same manner, as are all other persons committing such of-
fenses within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.
'2 7
However, the United States Supreme Court held that the
double jeopardy clause does not bar successive prosecutions in fed-
eral and tribal courts for violations of the Major Crimes Act and
tribal law, in United States v. Wheeler. 8 The Court noted that the
20. "As used in this section, the offenses of burglary, involuntary sodomy, and incest
shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which each offense
was committed . 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
21. Id.
22. 48th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 CONG. REc. 934 (1885).
23. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
24. 430 U.S. 641, 649 (1977).
25. 128 Mont. 37, 270 P.2d 396 (1954).
26. Id. at 41, 270 P.2d at 398.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3242 (1976). Note, Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 216 (1973)
(an Indian defendant, charged with a major crime under the Major Crimes Act, could re-
quest and receive an instruction on a lesser included offense not enumerated in that section,
even though the defendant could not have been charged with such an offense in the first
instance). Note also, United States v. Bowman, 679 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1210 (1983) (a federal court has jurisdiction to impose sentence upon an Indian of-
fender for a lesser included offense).
28. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
[Vol. 47
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Major Crimes Act is a "carefully limited intrusion of federal power
into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to
punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land. '2e The
Wheeler Court reasoned that the dependent status of Indian tribes
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States was not nec-
essarily inconsistent with the sovereign power of a tribe to prose-
cute its members for tribal offenses.30 The Wheeler Court also
stated that the second section of the Enclaves Act specifically pro-
vides that the Enclaves Act does not extend to an Indian "who has
been punished by the local law of the tribe."' 31 Therefore, the
Court affirmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction for non-major
crimes committed by Indians against Indians in Indian country.
32
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the Wheeler rule
in United States v. Jackson.33 The court held that, except for spe-
cific offenses under the Major Crimes Act, the tribal court has ju-
risdiction over all crimes committed by member Indians against
other Indians within Indian country.3 4 In addition, the court in
United States v. Johnson3 5 held, "[Elxcept for the crimes specifi-
cally enumerated in [The Major Crimes Act], the general rule is
that tribal courts have retained exclusive jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by Indians against other Indians in Indian coun-
try."36 Previously, in Ortiz-Barraza v. United States,3 7 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals had reasoned that the power to create
and administer a criminal justice system is intrinsic to the sover-
eignty of an Indian tribe. The tribe may exercise complete criminal
jurisdiction over its members, within the limits of the reservation,
subordinate only to the expressed limitations of federal law.'8 For
29. Id. at 325 n.22 (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.1 on remand,
555 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 324. Note, the Wheeler Court did not resolve whether the "dual sovereignty"
ruling would apply to courts of Indian offenses, which are governed by federal government
regulations rather than tribal law. Id. at 327 n.26. Note also, the U.S. Attorney recommends
no federal prosecution following a tribal prosecution, unless "substantial federal interests
were left unvindicated." UNtED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, ch. 20, at 15.
31. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
32. Id. at 332. Note, Wheeler overturned Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1965) which held that although Indian tribal courts have considerable jurisdiction over mat-
ters occurring on the reservation, including criminal offenses against Indians, the tribal
courts in the Fort Belknap Indian community function as arms of the federal government,
and the federal government maintains partial control over them.
33. 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
34. Id. at 1286. See also Antelope, 430 U.S. 641.
35. 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980)
36. Id. at 1231.
37. 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).




Wilson: Criminal Jurisdiction in Montana Indian Country
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
example, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 limits the penalties of
tribal courts to sentences not exceeding six months' imprisonment
or a $500 fine or both." The Ninth Circuit Court, in Tom v. Sut-
ton "° held the guarantees of due process and equal protection
under the Indian Civil Rights Act should be applied flexibly and
adapted to the tribal context.
A question remains, however, regarding a tribal court's juris-
diction over non-member Indians. Wheeler repeatedly referred to
the tribe's jurisdiction over members. Prior to Wheeler, tribal
courts routinely assumed jurisdiction over both member and non-
member Indians, because the federal statutes do not differentiate
between them."1 Upon their incorporation into the United States
and their acceptance of its protection, the tribes necessarily lost
some aspects of their sovereignty. In Wheeler, the areas in which
implicit divestiture of sovereignty occur involve the relations be-
tween an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe.42 By its con-
tinual reference to members only, Wheeler may stand for a nar-
rowing of tribal criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional distinction
between member and non-member Indians is currently before the
Ninth Circuit Court in Duro v. Reina.4s In Duro, an Arizona fed-
eral district court ruled that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction
by the Salt River Indian Community over non-member Indians vi-
olates the equal protection and due process provisions of the In-
dian Civil Rights Act.4" The Ninth Circuit's decision in Duro may
help clarify the member/non-member jurisdictional issue.
In summary, if crimes by an Indian against another Indian in
Montana Indian country violate both the Major Crimes Act and
tribal law, then federal jurisdiction remains primary although con-
current with tribal jurisdiction, under the Wheeler rule. For all
other crimes by an Indian against another Indian in Montana In-
dian country, tribal jurisdiction is exclusive under the Enclaves
Act.
the sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly
does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by
virtue of their dependent status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations be-
tween an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1968).
40. 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976). Note Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49 (1978) (habeas corpus is the sole remedy in federal court for violations of the Indian
Civil Rights Act).
41. W. CANBY, supra note 10, at 90.
42. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 327.




Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/12
JURISDICTION
III. INDIAN OFFENDER, NON-INDIAN VICTIM
Although the scheme of criminal jurisdiction under the En-
claves Act and Major Crimes Act seems complex in origin, it is
rational in light of its historical settings because substantial non-
Indian populations live on many Indian reservations."5 In United
States v. John,46 the Court stated that the Major Crimes Act pro-
vides a federal forum for the prosecution of Indians charged with
major crimes. This forum is necessary precisely because no state
jurisdiction over such crimes was contemplated in the early Trade
and Intercourse Acts and the Enclaves Act.47 In United States v.
Antelope," the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Major
Crimes Act and the Enclaves Act by rejecting an equal protection
challenge to the Major Crimes Act. The Antelope Court stated
that federal prosecution of an Indian under a theory of felony-
murder, for the murder of a non-Indian on an Idaho reservation,
did not violate the Constitution.4 9 The Court reasoned that the
Major Crimes Act, like all federal regulation of Indian affairs, is
rooted in the unique status of Indians as a "separate people" with
their own political institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes
is governance of once-sovereign political communities, and is not to
be viewed as impermissible legislation of a racial group consisting
of Indians.50 The Montana Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Irvine
v. District Court,5 1 has also held that exclusive jurisdiction lies in
federal courts for Indian violations of the Major Crimes Act.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly
held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Indians
committing crimes in Indian country in violation of the Major
Crimes Act. In Henry v. United States,2 the court stated that the
Major Crimes Act should control to the exclusion of the Enclaves
Act where a non-Indian is the victim of a major crime by an In-
dian. Later, in United States v. Broncheau,"3 the court stated that
Congress, in exercise of its plenary power, had deprived Indian tri-
bal courts of exclusive jurisdiction over offenses covered by the
Major Crimes Act. Thus, the United States District Court had ju-
45. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, ch. 20, at 14.
46. 437 U.S. 634.
47. Id. at 651.
48. 430 U.S. 641.
49. Id. at 649.
50. Id. at 646.
51. 125 Mont. 398, 239 P.2d 272.
52. 432 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.), modified, 434 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1011 (1971).
53. 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979).
1986]
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risdiction to try an Indian defendant charged with an offense
against a non-Indian under the Major Crimes Act.54 Again, in
United States v. Johnson,55 the court held that crimes subject to
federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act include Indian
against non-Indian crimes.
5 6
As noted earlier, federal courts have jurisdiction over all
crimes in Indian country governed by the general laws of the
United States, under the Enclaves Act.5 7 The Enclaves Act imports
into Indian country the entire body of federal criminal law, both
specific federal statute and general law related to criminal law.
5
8
The most important general law of the United States extended
into Indian country is the Assimilative Crimes Act,59 which applies
to offenses involving Indians against non-Indians. The Assimilative
Crimes Act borrows state criminal law and applies it through the
Enclaves Act to Indian country.60 Therefore, an Indian who com-
mits a non-major crime against a non-Indian might be charged
under the Enclaves Act with a violation of the Assimilative Crimes
Act, but the crime would be defined and the sentence prescribed
by state law.6 1 In Williams v. United States,s2 the Supreme Court
held that both the Enclaves Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act
apply to offenses committed in Indian country by an Indian
against a non-Indian. State law is assimilated only when no "enact-
ment of Congress" covers the conduct.
63
54. Id. at 1265.
55. 637 F.2d 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 1980).
56. Note Petition of Carmen, 270 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 934,
reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 973 (1959) (an Indian shall be subject to the same laws and penalties
and tried in the same courts as persons committing the same crimes within exclusive federal
jurisdiction).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1152: "[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country."
58. W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 108.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1984) provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or
acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission
which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory
or Possession, or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in
force at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and
subject to a like punishment.
The referred section 7 provides, "[Tierritorial jurisdiction of the United States, as used in
this title, includes: . . . (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States,
and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof .
60. W. CANBY, supra note 9, at 109-10.
61. Id.
62. 327 U.S. 711 (1946).
63. Id. at 717.
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The Ninth Circuit Court echoed Williams in a Montana case,
United States v. Burland.s" In Burland, the court held that under
the Enclaves Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act, federal prosecu-
tions of non-major crimes by Indians against non-Indians, enforce
federal law. The prosecutions incorporate by reference the details
of state law into the federal charges.
6 5
In summary, if an Indian commits a major crime against a
non-Indian in Montana Indian country, then federal jurisdiction is
primary under the Major Crimes Act. If the major crime also vio-
lates tribal law, then tribal jurisdiction is concurrent under the
Wheeler rule. If the crime is non-major, federal jurisdiction is cur-
rently exclusive under the Enclaves Act, in conjunction with either
a specific federal statute or the Assimilative Crimes Act.6
IV. INDIAN OFFENDER, VICTIMLESS CRIME
The first exception to the Enclaves Act has the effect of ex-
cluding from federal jurisdiction non-major crimes by Indians
against Indians. 7 Similarly, victimless crimes committed by Indi-
ans in Indian country may be excluded if the crime is purely an
internal tribal matter, subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction.18 The
victimless crimes do not actually involve offenses against the per-
son or property of either Indians or non-Indians. Rather, they typi-
cally involve crimes against public order and morals, such as traffic
64. 441 F.2d 1199.
65. Note that a potential gap in federal jurisdiction exists under the exception for
"any Indian committing any offense . . . who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe." The issue remains unlitigated, but the exception may preclude subsequent federal
prosecution for a non-major crime.
66. Burland, 441 F.2d at 1200. Note United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.
1978) (the court affirmed a conviction of an Indian for sodomy under state law through
application of the Assimilative Crimes Act, despite the similarity of a federal statute). Note
also, In re Little Light, 182 Mont. 52, 598 P.2d 572 (1979) (a Crow Indian was arrested by
the State of Montana within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation, for a state
crime committed off the reservation. The court followed State ex rel. Old Elk v. District
Court, 170 Mont. 208, 552 P.2d 1394, dismissed, 429 U.S. 1030 (1976), and held that the
arrest of an Indian on a reservation for a crime committed off the reservation was a valid
arrest). See also High Pine v. Montana, 439 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court
cited Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952): "The power of a court to try a person for a
crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by
reason of a forcible abduction."
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 provides that the Enclaves Act:
shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or prop-
erty of another Indian, not to any Indian committing any offense in Indian coun-
try who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be se-
cured to the Indian tribes respectively.
68. W. CANBY, supra note 10, at 111.
. 1986]
9
Wilson: Criminal Jurisdiction in Montana Indian Country
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
violations, prostitution, and gambling. However, if prosecution by
the tribe is unreasonably delayed or inadequate, the federal courts
will also consider prosecution. The Ninth Circuit Court, in
United States v. Marcyes70 held that these federal prosecutions of
victimless crimes may be based on the Enclaves Act and the As-
similative Crimes Act. The Marcyes rationale permits Enclaves
Act-Assimilative Crimes Act jurisdiction where state law prohibits
an activity as against public policy, as distinguished from state law
which merely regulates an activity.7' In Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribal Farm,72 the Ninth Circuit Court held that the tribal self-
government exception to federal regulation excepts purely intra-
mural matters, such as tribal membership and domestic relations,
from the general rule which subjects Indian tribes to other applica-
ble federal statutes.73
In summary, if an Indian commits a victimless crime in Mon-
tana Indian country, the tribal court has jurisdiction. If the tribe
fails to prosecute, and the crime violates the Assimilative Crimes
Act, then the federal court has concurrent jurisdiction under the
Enclaves Act.
V. NON-INDIAN OFFENDER, INDIAN VICTIM
Crimes subject to federal jurisdiction under the Enclaves Act
include non-Indian against Indian crimes.74 In addition, federal ju-
risdiction is exclusive where offenses by non-Indians fall within the
terms of the Act. 75 The Enclaves Act is the broadest jurisdictional
statute for crimes committed in Indian country. It provides for
prosecution of crimes by non-Indians against Indians and permits
punishment of all crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian ter-
69. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, at ch. 20, 16.
70. 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977).
71. For example, Montana prohibits some forms of gambling, such as slot machines, in
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-104 (1985); yet merely regulates other forms such as bingo, in
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-5-412 (1985).
72. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). Note United States v. Boggs, 493 F. Supp. 1050 (D.
Mont. 1980) (tribal sovereignty is not a shield against a grand jury investigation and
subpoena).
73. Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1117. See also United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th
Cir. 1976) (a federal court had jurisdiction to try a tribal game warden for violation of a
federal "felon in possession of a firearm" statute. The violation was committed by the In-
dian warden on the Fort Hall Indian Reservation, in the absence of any treaty right exempt-
ing the Indian from the operation of the statute).
74. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1231 nAL. Note United States v. John, 437
U.S. at 651 (the Supreme Court established the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction with re-
gard to the Major Crimes Act).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
[Vol. 47
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ritory. In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation,76 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Enclaves Act transfers into
Indian country the entire body of criminal law applicable to areas
under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The Court strongly affirmed the exclusivity of federal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians committing offenses against Indians by rul-
ing against a tribal court assertion of jurisdiction in Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe." The Suquamish Indians had become
dissatisfied with the federal law enforcement against non-Indians,
and thus asserted tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes, con-
tending that such jurisdiction was inherent in tribal self-govern-
ment. Although the Ninth Circuit Court agreed, the Supreme
Court reversed.7 8 It found this assertion inconsistent with the sta-
tus of tribes as dependent nations. The Court expressed a century-
old implicit conclusion which had been demonstrated by the
shared presumption of Congress, the executive branch, and lower
federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-
Indians. 79 The Oliphant Court held that Indian tribes may not ex-
ercise both the powers of autonomous states expressly terminated
by Congress and the powers inconsistent with their status.80 There-
fore, Indian tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, and may not assume such jurisdiction unless
specifically authorized by Congress.81
A recent Montana Supreme Court case invoked the Oliphant
rationale. In State v. Greenwalt,82 the Montana Supreme Court
held that Montana lost jurisdiction under the Enclaves Act when a
non-Indian stole Indian livestock. The Greenwalt court also held
that Montana lacks jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-In-
dians against Indians within the reservation, unless the enrolled
Indians have accepted state jurisdiction.8
In summary federal jurisdiction is exclusive for crimes com-
mitted by non-Indian offenders against Indian victims in Montana
76. 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979). See also Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714
(1946) (the United States had jurisdiction over the statutory rape of an Indian by a non-
Indian on the Colorado River Indian Reservation via the Assimilative Crimes Act and En-
claves Act).
77. 435 U.S. 191, on remand, 573 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978).
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id. at 203.
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id. at 213.
82. - Mont. -, 663 P.2d 1178 (1983).
83. Id. at -, 663 P.2d at 1183. See also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971) (acceptance of state jurisdiction can only come about by following Pub. L. No. 280
procedures, including a special tribal election for such acceptance).
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Indian country. The Enclaves Act provides the primary jurisdic-
tional tool for prosecuting non-Indian crime in Indian country. In
Oliphant, the Court expressly concluded that the actions of Con-
gress demonstrated an intent to prohibit Indian tribes from impos-
ing criminal penalties on non-Indians.84
VI. NON-INDIAN OFFENDER, NON-INDIAN VICTIM
Notwithstanding the broad terms of the Enclaves Act, federal
courts have significantly narrowed the reach of federal jurisdiction.
Over a century ago, in United States v. McBratney, 5 the Supreme
Court held that if a non-Indian commits a crime against a non-
Indian in Indian country, the state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction
unless there exist treaty provisions to the contrary. In McBratney,
a non-Indian had been convicted in federal district court of mur-
dering another non-Indian on the Ute Reservation in Colorado. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the federal court could only
exercise criminal jurisdiction over places within the "exclusive" ju-
risdiction of the federal government.8 " The Court reasoned that if
the state had any jurisdiction over this crime, then the federal
court necessarily had none. 7 The McBratney Court concluded that
the State of Colorado possessed jurisdiction because Congress had
admitted it to the Union on an "equal footing with the original
States" and Congress made no exception for jurisdiction over the
Ute Reservation.8
8
Fifteen years later, a non-Indian murdered a non-Indian on
the Crow Reservation in Montana. In Draper v. United Statess
the Supreme Court repeated the rule that the state court, not the
federal court, has jurisdiction over such crimes.90 Although Mon-
tana's Enabling Act seems to disclaim state jurisdiction by provid-
ing that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States,"91 the Draper
Court stated that Congress could not have intended any result so
drastic as the exclusion of Montana power to punish wholly non-
84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204. Note also, "By submitting to the overriding sovereignty
of the United States, Indian tribes necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress." Id. at 210.
85. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
86. Id. at 624.
87. Id. at 623.
88. Id. at 623-24.
89. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
90. Id. at 247.
91. 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
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Indian crimes committed in Indian country.92 In Organized Village
of Kake v. Egan,9" a case arising in Alaska, the United States Su-
preme Court subsequently explained that Montana's Enabling Act
disclaimer is of title, not jurisdiction, and the provision for "abso-
lute" federal jurisdiction does not necessarily mean "exclusive"
federal jurisdiction.9 4 Interestingly, the Kake Court also suggested
that state law and state court jurisdiction could be extended to
Indians as well as non-Indians in Indian country, so long as a di-
rect interference with the tribal government itself did not occur.9 5
The Ninth Circuit Court consistently has followed the Mc-
Bratney-Draper rule. In United States v. Cleveland,96 the court
held that the state in which an Indian reservation is situated has
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians on an Indian reservation. 7 Recently, in
United States v. Johnson,98 the Ninth Circuit Court noted that
states have jurisdiction to punish non-Indian defendants for crimes
against other non-Indians.9 9 The United States Supreme Court re-
emphasized the McBratney-Draper rule in United States v. Ante-
lope,'00 where, absent treaty provisions to the contrary, it sub-
jected a non-Indian charged with committing crimes against other
non-Indians in Indian country to prosecution under state law.'0 '
More recently, in United States v. Wheeler,' 2 the Supreme Court
noted that the Major Crimes Act does not apply to crimes commit-
ted by non-Indians against non-Indians, because such crimes are
subject to state jurisdiction.' 3
In summary, under the McBratney-Draper rule, Montana has
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians
against non-Indians in Montana Indian country.
92. Draper, 164 U.S. at 247.
93. 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 67-68. Note, however, that a reservation had not been created for the Alas-
kan Indians affected by the Kake decision. Subsequently, in civil cases dealing with the
extension of state law into Indian country, the Supreme Court has applied either a preemp-
tion analysis, or a test balancing tribal, state, and federal interests.
96. 503 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1070.
98. 637 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980).
99. Id. at 1231 n.11.
100. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
101. Id. at 645.
102. 435 U.S. 313.
103. Id. at 325 n.21.
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VII. NON-INDIAN OFFENDER, VICTIMLESS CRIME
A crime in Indian country is victimless if it lacks a concrete
and particularized threat to a person, to property, or to specific
tribal interests. 10' When a non-Indian commits a victimless crime
on Indian land, McBratney probably controls, granting Montana
jurisdiction.'0 Thus, general offenses which do not target a definite
class of Indians fall within state jurisdiction. Such offenses include
traffic violations, gambling, and disorderly conduct.
1 06
In New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,0 7 the Supreme Court held
that victimless crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state if Indian interests
are not directly affected. 08 Earlier, in Donnelly v. United
States,09 the Supreme Court ruled that a court need not invoke
federal jurisdiction to fulfill the guardianship responsibilities of the
United States if the victimless crime does not involve Indian
interests."10
In certain other cases, however, a sufficiently direct threat to
Indian persons or property may bring an ordinarily "victimless"
crime within federal jurisdiction."' Such crimes by a non-Indian
must be calculated to obstruct the functioning of tribal govern-
ment, or adversely affect the tribal community." 2 In the statutory
rape case of Smayda v. United States,"3 the federal government
prosecuted a non-Indian offender, under the Assimilative Crimes
Act, for a felony sex offense with a consenting under-age Indian, in
violation of state law. Therefore, if a "victimless" crime by a non-
Indian significantly threatens the Indian community, the jurisdic-
tion could revert to the federal courts as if the crime were directly
against an Indian.
In summary, Montana has exclusive jurisdiction over vic-
timless crimes by non-Indians in Montana Indian country. How-
ever, if the crime directly threatens the Indian community, the
crime is no longer victimless and jurisdiction reverts to the federal
104. Office of Legal Counsel, 6 Indian L. Rep. K-15ff (1979).
105. Id.
106. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, ch. 20, at 16.
107. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
108. Id. at 501.
109. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
110. Id. at 271-72.
111. UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, ch. 20, at 16.
112. Id. Examples of such crimes are bribery, riot, disruption of a public Indian meet-
ing, and consensual crimes committed by non-Indian offenders with Indian participants.
113. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966). See also United
States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (an offense against Indian public order was federally prose-
cuted under the Enclaves Act and the Assimilative Crimes Act).
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Criminal jurisdiction in Montana Indian country can be sum-
marized by offender and victim:
(a) Indian Offender, Indian Victim. For major crimes, federal
jurisdiction remains primary although concurrent with tribal ju-
risdiction."" For non-major crimes, tribal jurisdiction is
exclusive.1 "
(b) Indian Offender, Non-Indian Victim. For major crimes,
federal jurisdiction remains primary although concurrent with tri-
bal jurisdiction.1 ' For non-major crimes, federal jurisdiction is
exclusive. 1 '
(c) Indian Offender, Victimless Crime. Tribal jurisdiction is
primary, and federal jurisdiction concurrent." 8
(d) Non-Indian Offender, Indian Victim. Federal jurisdiction
is exclusive. 1 9
(e) Non-Indian Offender, Non-Indian Victim. Montana juris-
diction is exclusive.
12 0
(f) Non-Indian Offender, Victimless Crime. Montana juris-
diction is exclusive, unless Indian interests are directly affected.' 2'
114. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
115. Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224.
116. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
117. Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13.
118. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361.
119. Enclaves Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
120. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621; Draper, 164 U.S. 240.
121. Martin, 326 U.S. 496.
15
Wilson: Criminal Jurisdiction in Montana Indian Country
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1986
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss2/12
